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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______
No. 08-1564
______
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JESUS ZAVALA-GARCIA,
Appellant
______
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-399-03)
District Judge: Hon. Sylvia H. Rambo
______
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 22, 2011
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 1, 2011)
______
OPINION OF THE COURT
______
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Jesus Zavala-Garcia (“Zavala”) appeals from the District Court’s imposition of a
36 month sentence following his guilty plea. Zavala argues on appeal that the District
Court imposed an unreasonable sentence by failing to consider all of the arguments he

made in support of a downward variance and by inadequately explaining its basis for
their rejection.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we recount the facts and proceedings only
to the extent required for resolution of this appeal. On November 15, 2007, Zavala
entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to
distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
After Zavala entered his guilty plea, the probation department prepared a
presentence report (“PSR”) in which it determined that Zavala accrued four criminal
history points and therefore fit into Criminal History Category III.1 According to the
PSR, Zavala’s Total Offense Level was 21, which reflected a two level reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) for his minor role in the offense, and a three level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b). A total of 109
kilograms of marijuana was attributed to Zavala based on his participation in the
distribution conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. His combined criminal history and
offense level yielded a Guidelines imprisonment range of 46 to 57 months.
Zavala was sentenced on February 19, 2007. As of the date of sentencing, the
Government had filed a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 seeking a 10-month downward
1

Zavala received three criminal history points on account of a 2001 conviction for
forgery, which resulted in a sentence of 65 days’ to 23 months’ of imprisonment. He
received one criminal history point for a 1998 conviction for the summary offense of
harassment.
2

departure based on Zavala’s substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of
his co-conspirators. Zavala urged the District Court to vary downward further based on
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He presented three arguments in support of
this request. First, he argued that his criminal history category overstated the severity of
his prior crimes. Zavala asserted that the only reason he was incarcerated rather than
sentenced to probation for his forgery offense was because he could not afford to post
bail. Accordingly, he asked the court to limit consideration of this offense. Similarly,
Zavala argued that his harassment conviction merited little consideration because it was
over ten years old and only resulted in a fine. Second, Zavala argued that his base
offense level overstated the seriousness of the instant offense as the 109 kilogram
quantity of marijuana attributed to him was near the bottom of the 100- to 400-kilogram
Guidelines range. Third, Zavala claimed he was merely a “mule”2 and that his coconspirators took advantage of him by undercompensating him. As such, he insisted that
his offense level overstated the seriousness of his criminal conduct.
The District Court rejected these arguments and denied Zavala’s request for a
downward variance. The District Court did, however, choose to sentence Zavala based
on the very bottom of the applicable 46 to 57 month Guidelines range. Thus, after
granting the Government’s § 5K1.1 motion seeking a 10 month downward departure, the
District Court imposed a sentenced of 36 months.

In drug-drug trafficking parlance, a “mule” is a person who merely transports drugs.
See United States v. Holman, 168 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 1999).
2
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Thereafter, Zavala timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
“Our responsibility on appellate review of a criminal sentence is limited yet
important: we are to ensure that a substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in
a procedurally fair way.” United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).
“At both stages of our review, the party challenging the sentence has the burden of
demonstrating unreasonableness.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir.
2009) (en banc). The abuse of discretion standard applies to both inquiries. Id.
Appellate review of a criminal sentence proceeds in two stages. United States v.
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46
(2007)). We first must determine whether the District Court committed a “significant
procedural error,” for example, by “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors . . . or failing
to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see United States v.
Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). “A sentencing court need not make findings
as to each factor if the record otherwise makes clear that the court took the factors into
account.” United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, we
must assure ourselves that the District Court provided an “explanation . . . sufficient for
us to see that the particular circumstances of the case have been given meaningful
consideration within the parameters of § 3553(a),” Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196, and that
4

the sentencing court considered “any sentencing grounds properly raised by the parties
which have recognized legal merit and factual support in the record,” see United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
If the District Court’s decision is procedurally sound, we then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In reviewing the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence, “[w]e do not seek to second guess” the District
Court. See Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196. Instead, we seek to ensure that “the record as a
whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in §
3553(a).” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal
quotations omitted). Moreover, we are “highly deferential” to the sentencing court’s
application of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir.
2007). Accordingly, so long as a sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm “unless
no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.
III.
Zavala argues that the District Court imposed a procedurally unreasonable
sentence by failing to adequately consider his arguments urging a downward variance
under § 3553(a) and by failing to sufficiently explain its reasoning for rejecting these
same arguments. We disagree. Although the District Court did not address Zavala’s
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arguments at length, the record is adequate for appellate review and evinces meaningful
consideration of his arguments in favor of a downward variance.
The District Court clearly considered Zavala’s first argument regarding his
criminal history and adequately explained its decision not to vary downward on this
ground. In response to Zavala’s assertion that his prior forgery conviction should receive
limited consideration, the District Court explained its disagreement by noting that the
offense involved “just [] not one check . . . [but] three checks from [the] company by
whom he was employed . . . .” (App. at 22.) The District Court went on to explain, “I’m
not inclined to decrease the seriousness of that offense, so I will not depart based on the
guideline as far as his criminal history.” (Id.) Similarly, the District Court acknowledged
that the past convictions, including the summary harassment offense, “seem relatively
minor in terms of both the offense itself and as well as the recency,” but explained,
“[n]onetheless . . . given that, I think the [criminal history] computation is correct . . . .”
(Id. at 21.) Although the court did not specifically reference Zavala’s contention that he
served time for forgery only due to his inability to post bail, we believe these statements
in aggregate are sufficient to show meaningful consideration of his argument regarding
his criminal history. See Cooper, 437 F.3d at 332. Similarly, we find the explanation for
rejecting this argument adequate. See Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196.
It is also clear from the record that the District Court meaningfully considered
Zavala’s argument that his offense level overstated the seriousness of his criminal
conduct and role in the conspiracy. The District Court explained that “the weights are
6

what the guidelines call for, but both of these factors will be considered by me in starting
at the low end of the guideline, and the motion for downward departure will be based on
the low end of that calculation.” (Id. at 22.) Similarly, the District Court noted that
“with regard to his being duped into an offense, the Court did give him a two-level
reduction for his minor role, so that’s been factored into the sentence.” (Id. 21-22.) We
believe these statements evince meaningful consideration and sufficiently explain the
District Court’s reasons for not varying downward.3 Accordingly, we reject Zavala’s
contention that the District Court imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence.
To the extent Zavala’s arguments might also be interpreted as a claim that the
District Court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence by refusing his request for
a downward variance, we similarly reject this argument. We will affirm a procedurally
sound sentence as substantively reasonable “unless no reasonable sentencing court would
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district

3

Zavala insists that he was not actually seeking consideration of his minor role, but rather
consideration of his status as a “mule” and possibility that he was taken advantage of by
his co-conspirators because of the nominal pay he received. As noted earlier, in drugdrug trafficking parlance, a “mule” is a person who merely transports drugs. See
Holman, 168 F.3d at 660. Although Zavala’s role was minor compared to his coconspirators, he nonetheless actively participated in distribution activities. (PSR ¶¶ 5-8.)
Thus he cannot credibly claim that he functioned as a “mule.” Accordingly, the District
Court was not required to consider this argument. See Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329 (“The
court need not discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly
without merit.”) (internal citation omitted). Similarly, the fact that Zavala may have been
undercompensated for the effort he put into advancing the drug conspiracy is immaterial
for sentencing purposes.
7

court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. Here, the District Court concluded that a
sentence of 36 months was appropriate in light of Zavala’s criminal history, active role in
the conspiracy, and the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a).4 We are satisfied that
this sentence resulted from “rational and meaningful consideration of the factors
enumerated in § 3553(a),” Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (internal quotations omitted), and that it
is substantively reasonable.
IV.
Having found no procedural or substantive error, we will affirm the District
Court’s conviction and judgment of sentence.

4

Although the District Court only indirectly referenced § 3553(a) when explaining its
belief that the chosen sentence “[was] sufficient to address his sentencing objectives,”
(App. at 24 (emphasis added)), we are nonetheless satisfied based on this statement and
the record as a whole that the District Court meaningfully considered these provisions.
See United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing
the § 3553(a) factors as “sentencing objectives”); Cooper, 437 F.3d at 332 (noting that
“[t]here are no magic words that a district judge must invoke when sentencing”).
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